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NOTES AND COMMENTS
terms of the highest degree of care, the jury is impressed with the
peculiar hazards and the unusual advantages inherent in that calling.
It may be that these courts feel constrained to emphasize the most
significant circumstance-defendant's being a common carrier-in the
most conclusive way possible, in a legal rule or definition. This ap-
proach certainly seems to slight the opportunity courts have of de-
scribing all the circumstances in as great detail as deemed necessary
and suggests taking the easy "way out."
It is submitted that the proposition that a common carrier owes
its passengers the highest degree of care should be put to the jury
not in terms of a standard of conduct different from that imposed on
others, but rather in terms of what was reasonable and proper in view
of the duty owed and all the conditions and circumstances of the par-
ticular case. A charge of this nature would accord with the universally
accepted legal concept of the prudent man and at the same time make
intelligible to the lay triers of fact what precisely they are to decide."0
JOHN H. P. HELMS
Sales-Disclaimer of Implied Warranty Void Because Against
Public Policy.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.' the Supreme Court of
New Jersey considered the effect of disclaimer and limitation of liability
clauses contained in a standard automobile warranty. 2 The plaintiff
purchased an automobile from a local dealer as a gift for his wife. A
warranty was set forth in fine print on the reverse side of the sales con-
tract, together with a stipulation that there were no warranties, either
express or implied, except as provided for in the agreement s The
disclaimer was contained in the following words: "[T]his warranty be-
ing expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and
all other obligations or liabilities . . . ." In addition, the following
" The charge by the trial judge in the principal case would have this effect.
See note 3 supra.
1-32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960).
2The warranty is the uniform warranty adopted by the Automobile Manufac-
turers Association. It is used by all the major automotive manufacturers in the
sale of new automobiles. Thus, well over 90% of new car sales were covered by
this warranty and disclaimer. See Id. at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
' The express warranty provided: "The manufacturer warrants each new
motor vehicle (including original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer
except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in material
or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under this warranty
being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which shall,
within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or
before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur,
be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective. . . ." Id. at 367, 161
A.2d at 74. (Emphasis by the court.)
'32 N.J. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
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provision appeared in small print on the front side of the contract:
The front and back of this Order comprise the entire agree-
ment affecting this purchase and no other agreement or under-
standing of any nature concerning same has been made or entered
into, or will be recognized ....
I have read the matter printed on the back hereof and agree
to it as a part of this order the same as if it were printed above
my signature ....
Within two weeks after the delivery of the automobile the plaintiff's
wife had an accident while driving it due to a mechanical failure.
Actions against the manufacturer and the dealer were brought by the
wife6 for the personal injuries and by the husband for property damages,
each alleging a breach of implied warranty. The defendants contended
that the disclaimer barred any recovery except for the replacement of
parts. The court, however, found that the disclaimer was void as
being against public policy and allowed recovery.
The implied warranty of merchantability arose in order to alleviate
the harsh results of the rule of caveat emptori Whereas the latter
allowed the vendee virtually no recourse against a seller of defective
goods, the implied warranty placed upon the vendor the duty to provide
goods which were at least capable of being used for the purpose in-
Id. at 366, 161 A2d at 73-74.8Privity of contract is generally required for recovery on an implied warranty.
State ex rel Bond v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 146 Md. 390, 126
Atl. 105 (1924). However, some courts have recognized an exception where the
product is noxious or dangerous. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich.
683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409(1932) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). Although
this exception is generally found in cases involving food and drugs, the court in
the principal case pointed out that the harmful potential of a defective automobile
was analogous and held that the implied warranty ran with the sale of the auto-
mobile from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. The court went further
toward eliminating entirely the requirement of privity in this "dangerous products"
area by holding that the warranty extended to the purchaser's wife, who was not a
party to the contract, on the grounds that it was reasonably anticipated that she
would be a user of the automobile. This was carried even further in a dictum to
the effect that the warranty extends to other "members of his family, and to other
persons occupying or using it with his consent." 32 N.J. at 414, 161 A.2d at 100.
Query how much further a court holding an occupant could recover on an implied
warranty would have to go in order to allow a pedestrian injured by an automobile
to recover on the same theory.
In Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960),
the operator of construction equipment, an employee of the vendee in the sales con-
tract, brought suit for personal injuries against the vendor, alleging breach of
warranty. Held: An employee is not in privity, and therefore cannot maintain an
action against the seller. Thus, North Carolina would apparently not join the
New Jersey court in holding that the warranty ran to those using the automobile
with the consent of the owner.
With respect to the requirement of privity see 30 N.C.L. Rav. 191 (1952) ; 37
N.C.L. Ra,. 205 (1959) ; 7 RutGams L. Ra,. 420 (1953) ; 27 U. CINc. L. REv. 124
(1958).1 Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 543 (1925).
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tended.8  Consequently, a disclaimer began to be inserted in sales con-
tracts to enable the vendor to sell goods without liability based on implied
warranty.9
It is generally held that a vendor may contract away liability arising
from an implied warranty,10 and this right is sanctioned by the Uniform
Sales Act." However, since implied warranties arise to protect the
buyer, courts have generally held that disclaimers must be strictly con-
strued against the seller and must be express in their terms.12 Effective
disclaimers may be found in varying forms, but it is often difficult to
distinguish between some disclaimers which have been held binding13
and others which were ineffective because they were not sufficiently
express.' 4  For example, in Bekkevold v. Potts,15 involving the sale of
a tractor and trailer,. the disclaimer "no warranties have been made in
reference to said motor vehicle by the seller to the buyer unless ex-
pressly written hereon at the date of purchase" was held ineffective.
Yet in Butts v. Groover,'6 concerning the sale of a truck, the provision
that "no warranties, express or implied, and no representations, prom-
ises or statements have been made by seller unless indorsed hereon, in
writing" was held an effective disclaimer.
Disclaimers of implied warranty which would- be 'sufficiently express
'McConnell v. Jones, 228 N.C. 218, 44 S.E2d 876 (1947) ; Ashford v. H. *C.
Shrader Co., 167 N.C. 45, 83 S.E. 29 (1914). Cf. UNiFORm SALES AcT § 15(1).
See Comment, 23 MiN. L. REv. 784 (1938).
1077 C.J.S. Sales § 317 (1952).
-TlNiFORm SAL-s Acr § 71. "Where any right, duty, or liability would arise
under a contract to sell or a sale by. implication of law, it may be negatived .or
varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract of sale." The
act has been enacted into law into thirty-three states, the District of Columbia, and
the Panama Canal Zone. 1 UNiFORm LAWS ANNOTATD, Sales, at 7 (Supp. 1960).
"Roberts Distrib. Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal. App. 2d 664, 272 P2d
886 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) ; Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d
162 (1951) ; Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W.
713 (1933) ; Deere & Webber Co. v. Mock, 71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W'.2d 471 (1942).
"The above guarantee is in lieu of and excludes all other guarantees, war-
ranties, obligations or promises, express or implied, by contract or by law . .. ."
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Lea, 198 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1952). "[I]t is understood
and agreed that Greening-Smith Company shall not be held responsible for pro-
ductiveness and, or, quality of the undersigned's crops." Buckley v. Shell Chemical
Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 209, 89 P.2d 453 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939). -"We give no ivar-
ranty, express or implied, as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other
matter, or any seeds sent out, and will be in no way responsible for the crop. .
Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
" "This contract contains the entire agreement between Seller and Buyer; there
are no other representations, warranties or covenants by either party." Frigidin-
ners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
"This Contract becomes the entire agreement between the Buyer and Seller and
will contain all representations and agreements.' Torrance v. Durisol, Inc., 20
Conn. Supp. 62, 122 A.2d 589 (Super. Ct. 1956). The product is "not guaranteed
in any way." McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
19173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
"66 Ga. App. 20, 16 S.E.2d 894 (1941).
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in their terms to bar recovery may nevertheless be rendered ineffective.
A purchaser is, as a general rule, deemed to have notice of and to have
assented to all the terms of the contract, including the disclaimer. 7
However, in recognition of the complexities of modern business con-
tracts in which the disclaimer is placed in the body of the contract, some
jurisdictions have adopted the rule that the seller must have actually
called the attention of the purchaser to the disclaimer clause.' 8 This
rule is readily applied where the disclaimer is hidden in the contract
and calculated to escape attention.19 It would seem to be applicable to
the facts of the principal case, thus providing an alternative solution
without considering the public policy question.
The court in the principal case recognized that the doctrines of strict
construction and actual notice have been used to avert the effects of an
express disclaimer,20 yet it reached the same result by holding this
disclaimer to be "so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudica-
tion of its invalidity."'' l However, the court did not predicate its de-
cision on the more customary public policy consideration of danger to
the public. 22  Rather, it took the view that a disclaimer which the pur-
chaser had to accept due to his unequal bargaining position amounted
to a contract which had not been fairly procured and was thus against
public policy.
Only one decision has been found in which the North Carolina
court has held that an express disclaimer would bar recovery. In this
decision, J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. '. McClainrock,23 the court
held that a disclaimer prevented the purchaser of a piece of agricultural
equipment from proving inferior quality as a defense to the vendor's
suit for the purchase price. The court stated that "personal property
may be sold with or without warranty, and ... from an express stipula-
tion that the property is not warranted a warranty will not be implied."
24
1 E.g., Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945).
"
8 Stracener v. Nunnally Bros. Motor Co., 11 La. App. 541, 121 So. 617 (1929) ;
St. Louis Cordage Mills v. Western Supply Co., 54 Okla. 757, 154 Pac. 646(1916); Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
"
0 Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653(1948).
20 32 N.J. at 392, 161 A.2d at 87.
2 "Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
"'In Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110(New York Citp Munic. Ct. 1939), there was an express disclaimer of any war-
ranties on the sale of baked goods. The plaintiff was injured by a tack impounded
in a cookie and sued for breach of implied warranty. The court refused to allow
the disclaimer to be set up as a bar to the action, stating that it "must be recognized
that the health of the public is of the highest importance to the community and
it is against natural justice and good morals to permit an individual or corporation
to manufacture food containing dangerous foreign substances and to escape the
consequences of his act by a disclaimer. To permit such a disclaimer to be
effective would be against sound public policy." Id. at 880, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
" 152 N.C. 405, 67 S.E. 991 (1910).
21 Id. at 407, 67 S.E. at 992.
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Thus it appears that the North Carolina court recognizes that dis-
claimers may be effective.
It is apparent, however, that a disclaimer would not preclude a
recovery of the purchase price by the buyer should the seller furnish
non-merchantable goods. In Williams v. Dixie Chevrolet Co.,25 in-
volving the sale of an automobile, the court stated that the purchaser
could recover for want of consideration if the car were not fit for its
intended use due to the defect. The court said, "The refusal to warrant
against worthlessness would fall with the balance of the supposed con-
tract for want of consideration." 2 6  Of course, if the terms of the dis-
claimer apply only to quality, it will in no way affect an implied war-
ranty of merchantability.2r
The New Jersey court appears to be the first to declare this stand-
ard automobile disclaimer void.28  Courts of other jurisdictions have
given the disclaimer its full effect29 and have held that it does not
violate public policy.A0 It would seem, however, that the prior cases
have not met the real problem as seen by the New Jersey court-that
while a disclaimer of warranty should be available to parties who choose
so to contract, the imposition of these conditions by virtually all auto-
mobile manufacturers does not result in a freely bargained for and
fairly obtained agreement. It is submitted that the solution to this
problem can only be found by invoking the doctrine of public policy.
ROBERT B. BLYTHE
Torts-Negligently Induced Fright Causing Physical Injury to
Hypersensitive Plaintiff.,
In Williamson v. Bennett' the defendant negligently drove her auto-
mobile into that of the plaintiff; plaintiff did not see what had struck her,
but thinking that she had killed a child on a bicycle 2 she became fright-
ened. Plaintiff came to a stop and then saw that an automobile and not
a child had collided with her. Though plaintiff suffered no immediate
'209 N.C. 29, 182 S.E. 719 (1935).8Id. at 31, 182 S.E. at 721.
"* Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35 (1915).
" Another provision of the warranty has been attacked. In Mills v. Maxwell
Motor Sales Corp., 105 Neb. 465, 181 N.W. 152 (1920), the court stated, in a
dictum, that it was against "every conception of justice" to allow the manufacturer
to be the sole judge as to whether parts were so defective as to be replaceable.
" Shafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1953) ; L. R. Cooke Chevrolet
Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Serv., 282 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955); Hall v. Everett
Motors, Inc., 165 N.E2d 107 (Mass. 1960).
" Brokerick Haulage, Inc. v. Mack-International Motor Truck Corp., 1 App.
Div. 2d 649, 153 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
'251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E2d 48 (1960).
'About a month before the accident plaintiff's brother-in-law had killed a child
on a bicycle when she rode into the side of his car. 251 N.C. at 500, 112 S.E.2d at
49.
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